Where Behavioral Leadership Meets Emotional Intelligence - Shari Frisinger » Aviation Posts

Aviation Human Factors: The Pilot Ego Part 2

admin — Tue, 27 Jul 2010 15:43:21 +0000

On July 16, I wrote about the Pilot Ego, and gave words to describe what the Captains thought of their co-pilots and what the co-pilots thought of their Captains. More research has brought to light other interesting facts: Psychologists have studied pilots and have concluded there is a particular personality of pilots. From MBTI, they are intuitive extroverts. They are more attuned to understanding and forming patterns from the information received. They get their energy from being keenly involved in activities, not satisfied with sitting along the sidelines. They are also very logical, pragmatic and have strong desires for achievements. They also are caught in a paradox … balancing their strong ties for a solid family life with the yearning for new experiences. By far, however, the most prominent character trait of pilots, especially military and Alaskan bush pilots, is their absolute, solid, unwavering faith in themselves. This may account for the prevalence of Captainitis and the primary cause of several accidents. In the next several days we’ll explore the effect this had on the history of aviation.

Does 'Pilot Error' Really Exist?

admin — Mon, 26 Jul 2010 15:55:39 +0000

As we know, ‘pilot error’ is the cause of many accidents. The precursor of Pilot Error is aviation medicine …. This was a result of the aircraft manufacturers having to replace numerous crashed planes by pilot wanna-be’s. In the early days, the pilot wanna-be’s had to go through a series

Rally 'round the plane …

admin — Mon, 05 Jul 2010 17:15:18 +0000

I always thought Ben Stein was an intelligent, funny-looking guy with a nasally voice. I had no idea of his background: speech writer for presidents, a poverty lawyer, a trial lawyer in the field of trade regulation, actor, economist at the Department of Commerce, a university adjunct at several universities, a

Bailout Dilemma

admin — Thu, 04 Mar 2010 20:51:05 +0000

How often do you make a decision based on an assumption? You “paint with a broad stroke” instead of taking the time to investigate with an open mind? If you were the recipient of an unfair decision, how would you feel? Too often

Resume Who's Navigation?

admin — Thu, 07 Jan 2010 16:15:03 +0000

Communication is difficult enough without having to think through and explain absolutely everything we say. In certain professions, however, vague communications can be disastrous or even deadly. The solutions to many of our mistakes, or our friction, is quite simple — if you are unsure, ask questions and verify your

Captainitis in a Different Light

admin — Thu, 12 Nov 2009 15:58:16 +0000

Captainitis, the phenomenon that occurs when subordinates do not speak up to “the person in charge”, can rear its ugly head in many ways. In February 1980, a United Airlines career second officer [based on his lower than desired level of pilot proficiency], became the first officer! The captain, a friendly grandfather-type figure, did not challenge the decision when the first officer announced that he and the second officer would be changing positions. Even though the cockpit recordings contained inferences of uncomfortableness, encouragement and helpful cues, the captain did not acknowledge the tension these officers were feeling. Unfortunately, this story ends with a crash and no survivors. Both officers wanted to please the captain. The original second officer [who became the first officer] wanted to please his ’superior’, and did not communicate his uneasiness in becoming

Chain of Events: 1977 Tenerife Accident

admin — Mon, 09 Nov 2009 16:21:23 +0000

I’ve been doing research on the aviation accident that happened in Tenerife in the Canary Islands, Spain in 1977. This is an absolutely fascinating study in looking at how each element contributed to the fiery crash.

A chain of events is a sequence of events that, occurring consecutively, caused an accident. Had only one or two of these events happened, the accident may not have happened.

It all began with a bomb explosion in the Las Palmas terminal, diverting all flights to Tenerife. The KLM captain opted to let his passengers off the aircraft. Heavy fog rolled in. When it rolled back out, briefly, passengers were not quick to reboard.

From a communications perspective, the dialogue between the air traffic controllers, the KLM pilot, and the Pan Am pilot is a comedy of errors. When people from two aircraft talk on the radio at the same time, squelching occurs. This happened at a critical time when Pam Am stated they were still taxiing down the runway.

We will never know exactly what was rolling through the Captain’s mind … possibly expiring crew duty times, possibly the monies the airline would have to spend if the flight stayed overnight, perhaps “we’ve come this far we need to complete the task” …. was it loss avoidance or a tightly-held commitment?

As in all our lives, it isn’t what you said, it’s what they think they heard.

The Difference between Always and Almost Always

admin — Tue, 27 Oct 2009 14:11:51 +0000

In my leadership and communications seminars, we talk about ambiguous words …. words like ‘always’ , ‘almost always’, ‘rarely’ and ‘never’. The meaning of these words may seem clear to you…and yet you would be surprised at the responses. According to my research with flight departments, ‘always’ happens between 50%

Switching Hats and Mindsets Gives a Different Perspective

admin — Wed, 09 Sep 2009 14:27:18 +0000

I have just returned from NYC and an exciting conference … Air Carriers Purchasing Conference. The primary purpose of this organization is to connect airlines and ’suppliers’ — those of us that want to do business with suppliers. This was my sixth year to attend. Although there were many new faces, it was reassuring and energizing to have dozens of people ask me “Shari, when is your breakout session? I want to be there!” To those of you that asked, I appreciate your interest and check my website for my future sessions and keynote appearances. There were numerous instances where the people I was with experienced the “It wasn’t what they said, it’s what the other person thinks they heard.” In fact, we laughed about it and re-clarified our communication. It was fascinating to witness the actual instances …. being intelligent, articulate professionals that have known one another for years, we experienced the same communication. Yet our minds interpreted the words and the meanings in different ways. So it happens to the best of us! It’s not what you said, it’s what they think they heard

Aviation Human Factors: The Pilot Ego

admin — Mon, 13 Jul 2009 15:30:13 +0000

Years ago I did my Master’s [in Aeronautical Science from ERAU] on “Personalities in the Cockpit”. In that research, I surveyed career Part 91 pilots as to their communication style. These were all pilots in flight departments; I did not designate which were chief pilots and which were safety officers or Directors of Aviation. I am continuing this research, and have widened it to include all members in flight departments.

Part of my current research in communications deals with the ego of the pilot, and how this affects their communications. Being strong, being right, maintaining his status and reputation. All these are [or were] critical to the pilot’s self-image. And Captainitis.

At one time, captains were described as arrogant, over-confident, aggressive, incompetent and authoritarian by their co-pilots. This is according to the RAF Institute of Aviation Medicine. Captains, on the other hand, describe their co-pilots as lazy, difficult, complainer, resentful and bullying.

Aviation accidents, whether they be commercial aviation or business aviation, are fascinating studies. Reading over the cockpit data recorders, you can glean much information about the Captain and First Officer. How do they relate to each other? How do they communicate with the flight attendants? with ATC? What is said between them … and what is not said?

I have nearly completed my white paper on the Colgan Air Accident, with a focus on the personal situational awareness of the Captain. Email me if you’d like a copy … or stay tuned!

Remember, it isn’t what he said, it’s what they think they heard.