Captainitis, the phenomenon that occurs when subordinates do not speak up to “the person in charge”, can rear its ugly head in many ways.

In February 1980, a United Airlines career second officer [based on his lower than desired level of pilot proficiency], became the first officer!  The captain, a friendly grandfather-type figure, did not challenge the decision when the first officer announced that he and the second officer would be changing positions. 

Even though the cockpit recordings contained inferences of uncomfortableness, encouragement and helpful cues, the captain did not acknowledge the tension these officers were feeling.  Unfortunately, this story ends with a crash and no survivors.

Both officers wanted to please the captain.  The original second officer [who became the first officer] wanted to please his ’superior’, and did not communicate his uneasiness in becoming the first officer.  The captain wanted to please his first and second officers, and to build the confidence in the second officer. 

Back in those days, CRM – crew resource management – was not prevalent and though of very highly.  Senior Captains considered CRM – essentially a form of team building – for sissies and psycho-babble.  They could not understand why they had to be ‘part of the team’ and how that would promote safety.

CRM back then is very much like EI – Emotional Intelligence – today.  What benefits will come from understanding our own emotional triggers, and understanding what other people are experiencing?  Not just physically – sweaty palms, squirming – but linking these actions to what they are emotionally experiencing.    Empathy and compassion may be the two most difficult emotions for leaders to show. 

What would have happened if the second officer spoke up with his true feelings? If the captain would have spoken up and stopped the officers from swapping?

It wan’t what the officers said, it’s what the others thought they heard.

Years ago I did my Master’s [in Aeronautical Science from ERAU] on “Personalities in the Cockpit”. In that research, I surveyed career Part 91 pilots as to their communication style. These were all pilots in flight departments; I did not designate which were chief pilots and which were safety officers or Directors of Aviation. I am continuing this research, and have widened it to include all members in flight departments.

Part of my current research in communications deals with the ego of the pilot, and how this affects their communications. Being strong, being right, maintaining his status and reputation. All these are [or were] critical to the pilot’s self-image. And Captainitis.

At one time, captains were described as arrogant, over-confident, aggressive, incompetent and authoritarian by their co-pilots. This is according to the RAF Institute of Aviation Medicine. Captains, on the other hand, describe their co-pilots as lazy, difficult, complainer, resentful and bullying.

Aviation accidents, whether they be commercial aviation or business aviation, are fascinating studies.  Reading over the cockpit data recorders, you can glean much information about the Captain and First Officer.  How do they relate to each other?  How do they communicate with the flight attendants? with ATC? What is said between them … and what is not said?

I have nearly completed my white paper on the Colgan Air Accident, with a focus on the personal situational awareness of the Captain.  Email me if you’d like a copy … or stay tuned!

Remember, it isn’t what he said, it’s what they think they heard.

Continuing my thread of last week: aviation, Captainitis and the pilot ego ….

When you are stressed, how do you react? Do you fall into behaviors that you did years ago? In other words, do you regress? It may be something as simple as immediately rationalizing the situation or mumbling to yourself instead of talking directly to the person. Or it could be something drastic like slamming doors or speaking before thinking.

Or perhaps you have driven a stick shift car for years and years, and now you are driving an automatic. Let’s say you see you will be in an accident. In an effort to slow down, your left foot goes for the clutch and you shift the car into a lower gear. This is a regressive behavior.

Studies have found that pilots, when encountering a drastic situation in the aircraft, can regress to flying not the aircraft they are currently flying, but to do what they would do in a previously flown aircraft.

Stress can certainly include fatigue. In 1982, a Malaysian Airline System crew were flying an Airbus for Scandinavian Airlines. One would think that an Airbus is an Airbus … in this instance there were differences between the Malaysian Airbus and the Scandinavian Airbus. One of the differences was the ILS switches; the Malaysian Airbus had two positions, the Scandinavian Airbus had three positions.

This trip was extremely arduous, having four take-offs and landings. During the last landing, the first officer was having difficulty keeping the plane under control. The primary problem in this instance was that the first officer, in his moments of stress, had regressed to flying the Malaysian Airbus with the two positioned ILS, even though he was actively flying the Scandinavian Airbus with three positions.

The switches were similar, not exact. The more similar the item provoking interest or attention, the greater the chance of making a mistake.

Let me ask you …. What frustrating or difficult situations are you experiencing that causes you to exhibit regressive behavior?

Note: this thread will continue over the next several weeks.